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A B S T R A C T
Many ecological economists have argued that some natural capital should be preserved for posterity. Yet, among
environmental philosophers, the preservation paradox entails that preserving parts of nature, including the items
denoted by natural capital, is impossible. The paradox suggests that nature is a realm of phenomena independent
of intentional human agency, and that preserving and restoring nature require intentional human agency.
Therefore, no one can preserve or restore nature (without making it artificial). While this article argues that the
preservation paradox is more difficult to resolve than ordinarily recognized, it also concludes by sketching a
positive way forward to understand what it means to preserve natural capital during the Anthropocene.
1. Introduction
The concept of natural capital denotes a rich variety of active,
modifiable, and economically valuable production processes afforded to
human agents, gratis. Parts of nature, such as ecosystems, not only af-
ford human agents with passive materials and raw resources to be
improved by labor but endows them with production processes that
generate economically valuable goods and services in a manner that is
relatively detached from intentional human agency.
For decades, ecological economists and their life scientist colleagues
have insisted that some parts of nature denoted by the concept of
natural capital ought to be preserved (or conserved) for posterity.
However, no ecological economist has questioned the possibility of this
project. Environmental philosophers, on the other hand, have a long
tradition of scrutinizing this question. The so-called ‘preservation
paradox’ expresses a general skepticism towards preserving parts of
nature, including the items denoted by the concept of natural capital.
The paradox consists of the following three propositions: (1) nature is
that realm of phenomena that is independent of intentional human
agency; (2) preserving and restoring nature require intentional human
agency; (3) therefore, no one can preserve or restore nature without
making it artificial.
Some environmental philosophers have argued that the preserva-
tion paradox is false and, therefore, preserving nature is possible
(Sylvan, 1998; O’Neill et al., 2008). Against these views, this article
argues that the preservation paradox is more difficult to resolve than
ordinarily recognized.
To make my case, I propose several distinguishing features of
artificial objects, and argue that restored and preserved ecosystems
possess all of them. Artifacts are (1) designed or planned; (2) possess a
function attributed to them by an intentional agent (or a group of
agents); and, (3) have been modified by an intentional agent. While it is
rather straightforward to see that merely preserving natural ecosystems
involves (1) and (2), it is less obvious that it involves modifying them.
Nevertheless, I will argue that when the continued expression of a
natural ecosystem is counterfactually dependent on some human agent
intentionally omitting their actions from the ecosystem, and this omis-
sion is a ‘serious possibility,’ then it counts as modifying the natural
ecosystem. Thus, the preservation paradox seems warranted: no one
can preserve parts of nature without making them artificial.
Nevertheless, because this negative conclusion will strike most
ecological economists and their life scientist colleagues as un-
acceptable, Section 8 briefly sketches a promising way to resolve the
paradox.
2. Preserving natural capital and the preservation paradox
Natural capital denotes a rich variety of economically valuable
production processes afforded to human agents by nature, gratis. These
parts of nature, which include ecosystems and the biodiversity con-
tained therein, not only afford human agents with passive materials to
be improved by human labor, but endows them with production pro-
cesses or ‘natural machines’ that generate goods and services in a
manner that is relatively detached from human agency. The most well-
known study on natural capital and ecosystem services suggests that the
Earth’s entire biosphere, including a wide range of services generated
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by natural capital, such as the purification of water, nutrient cycling,
and the detoxification of wastes, is worth between $14 and $54 trillion
dollars, annually (Costanza et al., 1997, 2014).
Arguably, preserving natural capital for posterity is the mainstay of
strong sustainability, a widely held view associated with the earlier
work of Pearce et al. (1989) and Costanza and Daly (1992).1 The pro-
ponents of this view argue that because natural and manufactured ca-
pital (including machines, factories, and tools) are rarely substitutes,
sustainable development requires that each stock of capital be non-de-
clining over time. In the very least, most advocates of strong sustain-
ability agree that there is a subset of natural capital – critical natural
capital – that has no substitutes (Neumayer, 2003). If the proponents of
this view are correct, then some minimal stock of natural capital is
essential to sustainability. This position explains why so many ecolo-
gical economists and others have been particularly concerned with
preserving natural capital and ecosystem services. For decades, the
received view has been that while preserving natural capital might be
politically fraught, the project is possible.
The ‘preservation paradox’ challenges the received view. Without
labelling it as such, the philosopher Bernard Williams (1995) hints at
the paradox when he states:
What many conservation interests want to preserve is a nature that
is not controlled, shaped, or willed by us, a nature which, as against
culture, can be thought of as just there. But a nature which is pre-
served by us is no longer a nature that is simply not controlled. A
natural park is not nature, but a park; a wilderness that is preserved
is a definite, delimited, wilderness. The paradox is that we have to
use our power to preserve a sense of what is not in our power.
Anything we leave untouched we have already touched.
John O’Neill et al. (2008, 139) have described the preservation
paradox as follows: “nature … is what exists outside of any intentional
human intervention. Protection or restoration, on the other hand, re-
quires intentional human intervention in order to put it into effect. So,
how can it be possible to protect or restore, by intentional human
agency, something that is supposed to be independent of intentional
human agency?” On this account, the preservation paradox consists of
three propositions:
P1. Nature is that realm of phenomena that is independent of in-
tentional human agency.
P2. Preserving or restoring nature require intentional human
agency.
P3. Therefore, no one can preserve or restore nature without making
it artificial.
P1 is clear enough. ‘Nature’ is that part of the universe, which re-
mains detached from intentional human agency. This concept of nature
drives a wedge between intentional human agency and everything else.
For the purpose of this article, the only parts of nature that concern us
are those typically denoted by the concept of natural capital and those
which remain relatively detached from intentional human agency. I will
simply refer to these parts of nature as ‘natural ecosystems.’
For P2, I will accept the Society of Ecological Restoration’s defini-
tion of ecosystem restoration as, “the process of assisting the recovery
of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged, or destroyed”
(Sarkar, 2012, 132).2 On this account, restored ecosystems are
ecosystems that have been intentionally returned to some previous re-
ference state valued by human agents. Preserving ecosystems, by con-
trast, requires no such active human intervention. Instead, preserved
parts of nature, including ecosystems, are geographical areas or re-
serves that are protected from certain kinds of activities that are pro-
hibited or discouraged. Clearly, preserving nature in this sense does not
entail that it must remain identical or unchanging over time.
Is the preservation paradox warranted? Some scholars, namely,
John O’Neill et al. (2008) and Richard Sylvan (1998) have argued that
the paradox is false.3 As will be explained below, in Section 7, O’Neill
et al. have argued that there is at least one way to restore nature
without turning it into an artifact, and Sylvan dismisses the possibility
that merely preserving nature makes it more artificial. First, however,
Sections 3–6 argue that the preservation paradox is more difficult to
resolve than ordinarily recognized.
3. What is an artifact?
The preservation paradox claims that by restoring or preserving
parts of nature, one turns them into artifacts or makes them more ar-
tificial than they would be otherwise. What is an artifact?4 Reflecting
on the preservation paradox specifically, John O’Neill et al. propose
that “something is artificial if and only if it is what it is at least partly as
the result of a deliberate or intentional act, usually involving the ap-
plication of some art or skill” (2008, 128–9). This is a good start be-
cause it recognizes artifacts as intention dependent objects and dove-
tails with the concept of nature presupposed by the paradox. Beyond
O’Neill et al.’s account, however, we can add three features that dis-
tinguish artifacts from natural objects. Artifacts (1) are designed or
planned; (2) possess a function attributed to them by an intentional
agent or group of agents; and (3) have been modified by an intentional
agent. None of these features should bewilder the artifact theorist. In
fact, all three are widely accepted as necessary conditions that must be
satisfied for any object to qualify as an artifact.
First, Randall Dipert (1993) argues that, unlike natural objects, ar-
tifacts are necessarily objects that are designed and made by an in-
tentional agent.5 Planning or designing artifacts normally precedes the
construction of the artifact itself. Vermaas and Houkes (2003) concur,
suggesting that design is “a planned activity to contribute to a user plan
for achieving certain goals” (2003, 288). According to Vermaas and
Houkes, any satisfactory theory of artifacts must focus on the design of
the object at hand.
Second, it is widely accepted that all technical artifacts possess a
function (or purpose) attributed to them by an intentional agent. Lynn
Rudder Baker states that unlike natural objects, which come into ex-
istence without human intervention, artifacts are intention dependent
phenomena that are “made for a given purpose” (2008, 2–3). Risto
Hilpinen (2011) also defines artifacts as essentially “objects that are
intentionally made or produced for a certain purpose.” Dipert (1993),
too, agrees that artifacts are, invariably, made for a certain purpose
while adding the further claim that an artifact’s function is to be
grounded on the use and design of artifacts (Perlman, 2004). In the case
of ordinary technical artifacts such as tables or chairs, all such items
1 ‘Weak sustainability,’ on the other hand, is traditionally associated with the
work of Robert M. Solow (1986, 1993). This view requires that the total stock of
capital is held constant across time or between generations. On this view, there
is nothing special about the stock of natural capital, which can be depleted so
long as it is supplanted by a sufficient quantity of manufactured capital (Stern
1997).
2 José M. Rey Benayas et al. (2009, 1121) offer a similar definition of eco-
logical restoration. This activity involves, “the recovery of an ecosystem that
has been degraded damaged, or destroyed, typically as a result of human
(footnote continued)
activities.”
3 Robert Elliott (1982) and Eric Katz (1992, 2012) have made similar claims
by arguing that restored nature is artificial and that, because of this, it has less
value than its wild counterpart does. This article makes no claim about the
diminished value of restored nature.
4 This article is only concerned with ‘technical artifacts,’ which includes ev-
eryday physical objects such as tables, chairs, and houses, all of which have a
practical use for intentional agents. Technical artifacts generally exclude works
of art, including paintings and sculptures.
5 Dipert’s (1993) Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency is among the first analytic
explorations into artifacts (see Perlman, 2004).
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possess specific functions that have been attributed to them, not by
nature, but by an intentional human agent or a group of such agents. It
is only by virtue of being intention dependent objects that tables are for
eating meals, chairs are for sitting, etc.6
The third and final feature that distinguishes natural objects from
artifacts is that the object must have been modified – in some way,
shape, or form – by an intentional agent. Hilpinen has argued that ar-
tifacts necessarily have a maker or author, and he outlines the following
Dependence Condition that must be met for any object to be considered
an artifact:
The existence and some of the properties of an artifact depend on an
author's intention to make an object of a certain kind (Hilpinen,
1992, 65).
This widely accepted condition is normally interpreted as requiring
that the author of an artifact must, in some minimal sense, actively
modify, transform, or improve some object before it is considered to be
a bona fide artifact.7 This condition also helps to explain why not ev-
erything that merely happens to be produced by human agents is an
artifact. The agent who intends to build a hammer with a wooden
handle and a steel head, a technical artifact that is first designed and
then made for striking hard surfaces, does not also intend to cast a
shadow against the wall of the building where he works, nor does the
agent intend to produce a plume of sawdust when cutting the wood to
fashion the handle. The latter two events are not the result of inten-
tional actions, but mere happenings. In other words, there is a con-
ceptual distinction to be made between objects that are made by in-
tentional human agents and those things that are merely caused by
human activity. Hilpinen’s dependence condition explains why the
hammer is a technical artifact while the shadow and the sawdust are
not.8
4. Is the preservation paradox warranted?
So, how do the restored and preserved ecosystems denoted by the
concept of natural capital measure up to these three features of arti-
facts? Are they designed or planned? Do they possess a function? Has an
intentional agent modified them? If restoring and preserving natural
ecosystems involves planning, attributing them with a function, and
intentionally modifying them in some way, then such objects are arti-
ficial, and the preservation paradox seems warranted.
First, it should be evident that the activity of restoring ecosystems,
the process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been
degraded, damaged, or destroyed in order to bring about some desired
effect, requires making a plan or design. In his Nature by Design: People,
Natural Process and Ecological Restoration, Higgs (2003) argues that
“restoration is fundamentally about design.” Planning a restored eco-
system not only requires determining the targeted historical reference
state that happens to be preferred or desired by human agents, but it
also requires establishing the most effective means for attaining the
final product: a restored ecosystem. Without a plan or design, even if it
is imperfect or incomplete, that precedes the actual restored ecosystem
it is difficult to see how any ecosystem could, in fact, be restored.
Planning in this sense, even if the plan ultimately fails, is not merely
required for restored ecosystems but for preserving ecosystems as well.
While preserving natural ecosystems does not involve active human
intervention, it does involve minimal planning whereby specific in-
tentional activities must be cordoned off from adjacent areas (not
preserved by human agents).
Second, ecosystems that have been denoted by the concept of nat-
ural capital possess a function attributed to them by human agents: to
produce economically valuable goods and services to human agents. It
is worth emphasizing, however, that restored and preserved ecosystems
are sufficiently different from ordinary technical artifacts to be con-
sidered a special class of technical artifacts. Unlike ordinary artifacts,
such as tables and chairs, that do not possess a function independent of
those attributed to them by intentional agents, ecosystems (and other
biological phenomena) may possess non-intentional natural functions
(Odenbaugh, 2010; Sperber, 2007).
Finally, restored and preserved ecosystems have been modified by
an intentional agent. This claim requires an extended argument, par-
ticularly with respect to natural ecosystems that are merely preserved.
Recall from the previous section that Hilpinen’s dependence con-
dition requires that the selected properties of an artifact depend on an
author's intention to make an object of a certain kind. The first thing to
recognize is that this condition is causal and that it is normally inter-
preted as requiring that the author of an artifact actively modifies some
natural object. Interpreted in this way, the author of an artifact must
modify some object vis-à-vis intentional activity for that object to be
considered an artifact. If this were the only way to interpret Hilpinen’s
dependence condition, then my claim that preserving natural ecosystems
turns them into artifacts would be problematic since natural ecosystems
are, by definition, relatively detached from intentional human activity.
In fact, under the standard interpretation of the dependence condition,
natural ecosystems are not artifacts at all, but something else.
Dipert (1993), for one, would disagree with my claim that preserved
natural ecosystems are artifacts. He would argue that if such an eco-
system were simply discovered and intentionally used for some pur-
pose, it would not be an artifact but an ‘instrument.’9 For Dipert (1993,
23–7), instruments are items that have been intentionally used but that
do not possess sufficient characteristics or qualities to render them
genuine artifacts. Dipert explains:
for an object to be intentionally used by an agent, the agent has to
have conceived of one or more of these properties, deliberated about
whether this or another object could better fulfill the purpose be-
cause of these properties, and concluded that the object will make a
net positive contribution to the agent’s purpose and that it will do
better than, or as well as, other objects that are considered and
equally available (1993, 25).
According to Dipert, instruments are generally middle-sized and
moveable objects that, unlike artifacts, are not modified but are merely
found or discovered and used “as is” – natural objects that are used for
some goal or purpose. For example, a fallen log that is found and then
intentionally used by some human agent to serve as a seat or a foot stool
qualifies as an instrument, not a genuine artifact, on Dipert’s account.
The same is true of a stone that is found and then intentionally used by
some agent to strike one’s foe. Dipert gives the example of the stone that
David used to slew Goliath. He states, “we might guess that an object’s
merely being deliberately used in intentional activity, such as the handy
stone with which David slew Goliath, is not sufficient to make it an
artifact. What, after all, did David do to the stone to make it an artifact?
How does it differ from a stone that was not used intentionally?” (1993,
21; emphasis added). According to Dipert, David must do something to
the stone in some way before it can be considered a genuine artifact.6 How might such objects acquire a function attributed to it by an intentionalagent? See John Searle (1995; 2010).
7 Siipi implicitly accepts Hilpinen’s dependency condition when she states,
“an entity x is an artifact if and only if x has been intentionally brought into
existence by causing the artifact x to have certain properties” (2003, 417).
8 Hilpinen’s dependence condition may not exclude all the animal artifacts
made by non-human creatures (Hilpinen, 2011). On his account of animal ar-
tifacts, James L. Gould (2007) supplants intentionality as a necessary condition
for making artifacts with its mere usefulness for a creature.
9 Similarly, Hilpinen (2011) recognizes a category of items that are between
natural objects and artifacts. Following anthropologists and others, Hilpinen
refers to such items as ‘naturefacts.’ Naturefacts are items that are simply found
and used. Because they have not been intentionally modified or improved,
naturefacts are not artifacts.
C. Tyler DesRoches Ecosystem Services 41 (2020) 101058
3
Namely, he must actively and intentionally modify it. Thus, under Di-
pert’s account, instruments are like artifacts in the sense that they are
used by intentional agents but they are different in the sense that in-
struments are merely found and used, whereas artifacts are always
modified or improved by intentional activity. In other words, Hilpinen’s
dependence condition, or something like it, is required for any object to
qualify as an artifact.
Since restoring ecosystems requires active and intentional human
intervention to bring about some desired state of affairs or intended
effect, I will take it as a matter of course that restored ecosystems are
objects that satisfy Hilpinen’s dependence condition. The more chal-
lenging case is to insist that merely preserving natural ecosystems turns
them into artifacts. If I am to uphold this claim, then I will need to show
that the dependence condition can be interpreted differently than is
normally the case. I will argue that the dependence condition can be
interpreted as the properties of an artifact that are dependent upon an
author’s intention to make an object of a certain kind by intentionally
omitting their activity and that such an omission can count as genuine
causation. When Hilpinen’s condition is interpreted in this way, by
omission rather than action, we can see that there are circumstances
when merely preserving natural ecosystems turns them into artifacts. If
I am right, then unlike the existence of ordinary technical artifacts, such
as tables and chairs, which require that such objects have been actively
modified for some purpose, the existence of ecosystem artifacts can
depend on intentionally omitting human activity as well.
5. Causation by omission
To understand how causation by omission is plausible, consider
James Woodward’s (2003) manipulability theory of causation. Wood-
ward states that “X is a … cause of Y if and only if there is a possible
intervention on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of
Y” (2003, 51). He defines an intervention variable I and putative cause
and effect X and Y only if I meets the following four conditions (2003,
98):
1. I causes X.
2. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That is,
certain values of I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases
to depend on the values of other variables that cause X and instead
depends only on the value taken by I.
3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not
directly cause Y and is not a cause of any of Y that are distinct from
X except, of course, for those causes of Y, if any, that are built into
the I–X–Y connection itself; that is, except for (a) any causes of Y
that are effects of X (i.e., variables that are causally between X and
Y) and (b) by any causes of Y that re between I and X and have no
effect on Y independently of X.
4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y and
that is on a directed path that does not go through X.
On this manipulationist account, a causal relationship not only
obtains whenever some factor is manipulated, and some effect is rea-
lized. A causal relationship also obtains when the following holds: if the
factor were to be manipulated, then the effect would be realized. In this
sense, Woodward’s theory shares many features with counterfactual
theories of causation, including that proposed by David Lewis (1973).10
Because a sufficient condition for some X to cause or have a causal
effect on Y is that some change in the value of X produced by an in-
tervention is associated with a change in the value of Y, omissions can
be causes as well (Woodward, 2009). Unlike process theories of cau-
sation that do not generally view causation by omission as being gen-
uinely causal, Woodward’s theory can account for intuitively plausible
causal claims such as “I killed the plant by not watering it” (Beebee,
2004).11 Why does this qualify as a genuine causal relation under
Woodward’s account? Since a change under an intervention in whether
the person in charge of watering the plant is associated with a change in
the value of the variables measuring whether the plant dies, the state-
ment ‘I killed the plant by not watering it’ is a genuine causal claim.12
In this case, causation by omission is no different in kind from the
following causal claim: ‘I killed the plant by uprooting it and tossing it
into the dustbin.’
A central challenge for theories of causation that sanction omissions
as genuine causes is to restrict the number of genuine causal claims so
that they do not diverge too far from our intuitions. Woodward gives
the example of a Doctor D. Suppose it was standard practice for doctors
to administer antibiotics when they notice patients displaying symp-
toms of fever. Suppose further that D noticed that his patient P had a
fever and he administers no antibiotic. Woodward’s (2003) manipul-
ability theory of causation supports the judgement that the failure of D
to administer the antibiotic to P causes P to die. Why? Since manip-
ulating the values of the variable A (which reflects whether or not the
antibiotic is administered) will change the value of the variable S
(which reflects whether or not the patient dies), D causes P to die. Thus,
much like the case whereby a person is judged to have killed the plant
by failing to water it, D causes P to die.
Now, suppose that some random person X could have administered
the antibiotic but does not and it seems correct to claim that X did not
cause P to die. X is not a doctor, and he lives in a far-off land without
any responsibility for the care of the patient who is displaying signs of
fever. Suppose further that X goes into the exact hospital where the P is
located, and he can actually see that P is developing a fever. Not only
does X witness P in such a grim state but, as it turns out, X has also
recently learned that administering antibiotic to patients who were in
such a circumstance is the correct response required to keep P alive. In
this case, we can say that P’s survival is counterfactually dependent on
whether X administers the drug to the patient. However, relative to the
first case, it is not so clear that P causes X to die. In fact, Woodward
argues that we are not normally inclined to claim that X causes the
patient’s death. In both cases, the patient dying is counterfactually
dependent on someone – D or X – failing to administer the antibiotic. In
the first case, when D fails to administer the antibiotic, we more readily
accept the causal claim that D killed P. In the second case, we are more
likely to reject the claim that X killed P. But, why do we tend to accept
some omissive causal judgements (D killed P) while rejecting others (X
killed P)?
To explain this difference, Woodward appeals to the notion of
‘serious possibility.’ Given everything we know about Doctor D, random
person X, and patient P, Woodward states, “there seems no reason at all
to take the possibility seriously that X’s failure to do these things causes
the patient’s death” (2003, 88). Other things being equal, ‘X killed P’ is
not a serious possibility and, therefore, should not be judged as genuine
causation. Woodward acknowledges that it is unlikely that there is any
algorithm for determining whether a putative omissive causal
10 This article takes no final stand on the correct or true universal theory of
causation, each of which appears to be subject to counterexamples (Reiss,
2009). My argument below assumes Woodward’s manipulability theory, which
I take to be the most popular theory of causation among contemporary philo-
sophers of science. With that said, I expect that the conclusion reached under
Woodward’s theory holds under David Lewis’ (1973) counterfactual theory as
well. Such a comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this article. For a
(footnote continued)
detailed comparison of Woodward’s manipulationist theory and Lewis’ coun-
terfactual theory of causation, see Woodward (2003, 133-45).
11 Process theorists, such as Salmon (1984) and Dowe (2000), do not consider
causation by omission to be genuinely causal.
12 For more on causation by omission or absence causation, see Hall (2000)
and Schaffer (2000).
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relationship ought to be taken seriously. Instead, he suggests a multi-
tude of factors that can influence our willingness to take omissive
causal claims seriously, including our interests, purposes, expectations,
and norms.13
6. When preserving natural ecosystems turns them into artifacts
With some understanding of Woodward’s account of causation by
omission, we can return to our question: does preserving parts of nature
denoted by natural capital satisfy Hilpinen’s dependence condition?
Remember, this condition is normally interpreted as requiring that at
least some of the properties of an object are dependent upon the in-
tentional activities of a maker. By contrast, I am suggesting that the
condition can be interpreted as requiring that at least some properties
of an object are dependent upon an author’s intentionally omitting their
activity from the object. In our case, the object at hand is a natural
ecosystem that is being preserved by some intentional agent or group of
intentional agents. If Hilpinen’s dependence condition has been met in
this way, then preserving natural ecosystems turns them into artifacts
(assuming they also have the other two features of artifacts delineated
in Section 3).14
My central claim is that, for those cases of preservation where the
expressions of natural ecosystems are counterfactually dependent on
omitting human activity, and the omission is a serious possibility, then
such omissions are a cause of the continued natural expression of the
natural ecosystem. In all such cases, the natural expression of a natural
ecosystem depends, in part, on the agent’s intention to make an object
of a certain kind by omitting their activity from that natural ecosystem.
Consider an example, Vulcan. Suppose there is a planet, Vulcan, that
was discovered in the Milky Way.15 Vulcan is a jungle planet that has
never been touched by intentional creatures, including human beings. A
group of human beings, the United Federation of Planets, analyzed
Vulcan remotely and possessed the technological means to transform
the surface of the planet. Soon after Vulcan was discovered, however,
the Federation forbade anyone from landing on the planet or interfering
with it in any way. The Federation declared that Vulcan was to become
one giant nature preserve, the purpose of which was to produce a de-
sired aesthetic effect. The Federation enforced its edict strictly and
successfully. If the Federation had not chosen to turn Vulcan into nature
preserve, then it would have chosen the only other option available: it
would have transformed Vulcan into a parking lot for the space crafts
owned by members of the Federation. In fact, this was standard prac-
tice. The Federation tended to develop, in some way, every untouched
planet it discovered. This was the norm.
Has Vulcan become more artificial (than it would be otherwise)?
Was there genuine causation by omission in this case? If the natural
processes on Vulcan would have continued no matter what, then it seems
that Vulcan would not have been rendered more artificial by the
Federation’s omission. However, the omission is a serious possibility
and counts as genuine causation. Why? If the Federation had not left
the planet untouched, then it would have chosen the only other avail-
able option. Vulcan would have been transformed into a parking lot.
Moreover, this outcome was to be expected, given the Federation’s
standard practice of developing every untouched planet it encountered.
The Federation’s omission is a cause of Vulcan’s continued natural
expression.
One might object by insisting that this omissive causal claim is a
non-serious possibility or counterintuitive at best and, therefore, should
be rejected. After all, it seems absurd to suggest that knowing Vulcan
exists and leaving it untouched is sufficient to make the planet more
artificial. This objection would fail to grasp the justification for ac-
cepting the causal claim as genuine, however. Vulcan has been made
more artificial not only because the Federation knows that Vulcan exists
and leaves it untouched, but because the Federation also chooses to
omit their intentional activity from the planet when their only other
option, the one they would have chosen otherwise, was to turn Vulcan a
parking lot. The Federation’s omission is a serious possibility and counts
as genuine causation.
To accentuate this point, consider a non-serious possibility. Suppose
that a random group of intentional creatures located on the other side
of the Milky Way also omitted their activity from Vulcan. This second
group knew about Vulcan, had the technological means to transform it,
but had no interest in the planet, period. The group simply ignored the
planet. This was their standard practice – to neglect all planets, except
for their home planet. Unlike the Federation’s omission, which actually
contributed to Vulcan’s continued natural expression, the random
group’s omission does not. In this case, the random group’s omission is
a non-serious possibility in the same way that the random Person X’s
omission (from the previous section) was a non-serious possibility.
Consider another example, Hydroelectricity, that is structurally
identical to Vulcan. Suppose that a group of human beings, ‘The Valley
People,’ must choose between two available options: (1) preserve some
natural ecosystem located in a valley by intentionally omitting their
activity from the area, or (2) flood the area where the natural ecosystem
is situated to produce hydroelectricity for the local citizens. (To be
clear: The Valley People know that (1) and (2) are the only live options
and, moreover, this group has the capability to choose either option). If
the Valley People select option (1), then the ecosystem will continue to
express itself in a manner that is relatively detached from intentional
human agency. If the Valley People select option (2), then the natural
ecosystem will be completely destroyed (submerged under water). The
natural ecosystem will not continue to express itself.
After deliberating, the Valley People choose option (1). This is
striking because standard practice for the Valley People is to turn every
valley capable of producing hydroelectricity into a reservoir to serve
that purpose. We know ex hypothesi that if the group had not preserved
the natural ecosystem by omitting their intentional activity from the
area, the group would have chosen option (2). In this example, the
ecosystem’s continued natural expression is counterfactually dependent
on whether the Valley People omitting their activity from the ecosystem
to produce the ecosystem’s continued natural expression. Similar to
Vulcan, the continued natural expression of the ecosystem depends
causally on the Valley People intentionally omitting their activity from
the natural ecosystem. This omission is not only a serious possibility,
but an instance of genuine causation.
Now, contrast this claim with a non-serious possibility. As the Valley
People decided to omit their activity from the valley, a second group of
human beings neglected to transform the valley, too. This latter group
knew about the valley and had ability to transform it. While the second
group’s omission and the Valley People’s omission both count as
omissions, only the latter omission contributed to the valley’s continued
natural expression for the same reasons discussed in Vulcan. The
former, by contrast, is a non-serious possibility.
7. Potential objections
Richard Sylvan (1998) and Robert Elliott (1982) are both critical of
the claim that intentionally omitting human activity can be causal in
the sense that I have suggested. In his essay entitled “Mucking with
Nature”, Sylvan dismisses the whole preservation paradox as the
“bottom of a barrel of rotten arguments.” He is critical of the claim that
13 Henne et al. (2017) report experimental evidence to support the claim that
norms influence omissive causal judgments in the way that Woodward (2003)
suggests. While one might suppose that reliance on subjective factors represents
a significant shortcoming of Woodward’s theory, any theory of causation that
attempts to accommodate omissive causal relations must address the issue of
‘serious possibility’ in some way.
14 Similarly, in his essay entitled “The Incarceration of Wildness: Wilderness
Areas as Prisons”, Thomas Birch (1990) argues that wilderness areas are arti-
ficial since they are products of human power (Katz, 2012).
15 Thanks to Kevin D. Hoover for an earlier version of this example.
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“doing nothing counts as doing something, inaction as action, so non-
interference itself amounts to interference” (1998, 57). While Elliott
concedes that restored ecosystems are artificial, he maintains that
merely preserving nature does not make nature artificial. He states:
The idea is that by placing boundaries around natural parks, by
actively discouraging grazing, trail-biking and the like, by prohi-
biting sand-mining, we are turning the wilderness into an artefact,
that in some negative or indirect way we are creating an environ-
ment … But … what is significant about wilderness is its causal
continuity with the past. This is something that is not destroyed by
demarcating an area and declaring it a national park. There is a
distinction between the ‘naturalness’ of the wilderness and the
means used to maintain and protect it. What remains within the
park boundaries is, as it were, the real thing (Elliott, 1995, 87 in
O’Neill et al. (2008, 139–40).
Elliott suggests that preserving wilderness is preserving the ‘real
thing’ since there is causal continuity with the past. Once certain
boundaries are established, the place is not made into an artifact but
remains part of nature. One problem with this line of reasoning, how-
ever, is that anything that happens to a wilderness area or natural
ecosystem would qualify as having causal continuity with the past.
Another problem is that, as argued above, there are cases of mere
preservation when the expression of nature or natural ecosystems is
counterfactually dependent on omitting human activity. In such cases,
the omission causes the continued natural expression of a natural eco-
system in a manner that both Sylvan and Elliott deny. It should also be
clear that, contra Elliott’s (1995) worry, I am not suggesting that the
mere imposition of a boundary around some natural ecosystem turns
that ecosystem into an artifact. Instead, my claim is that Hilpinen’s
dependence condition is met when preserving a natural ecosystem in-
volves the intentional omission of human activity.
John O’Neill et al. (2008) have also argued that the preservation
paradox is false since there is one distinctive sense in which restoration
is possible. To make their case, these authors draw an analogy between
biological regeneration on the one hand and the restoration of nature
on the other. They begin by observing that certain species can naturally
regenerate parts of their bodies, quite independent of human agency.
For example, these authors tell us that many lizards have the capacity to
re-grow their tails. Similarly, they argue, nature can be restored when
non-human agency alone does the restoration. Specifically, they claim that
“a system that has regenerated entirely ‘naturally’, that is, without in-
tentional or even unintentional assistance of human beings, might be
said to have originated naturally, even though it no longer has the
particular historical origin it once had. It has restored itself rather than
being restored” (2008, 143). On this account, nature’s unassisted
agency can restore nature and, therefore, the preservation paradox is
false. There is at least one way that nature can be restored without the
active intervention of intentional human agents.
While there is a distinction to be drawn between objects that grow
up spontaneously, independent of human agents, and those that require
active human intervention, it remains unclear what consequence this
distinction has for the paradox. Restoration is essentially an intentional
activity performed by an intentional agent who has the aim or goal of
returning some object to a previous condition or reference state. To
claim that restoration is possible when consummated by natural or non-
human causes alone is to speak metaphorically or attribute in-
tentionality to nature. Neither option seems acceptable. While I am in
full agreement with O’Neill et al. (2008) when they claim non-human
agency is causally efficacious in the sense that there are non-human
causes that operate independent of human intervention (i.e., lizards
that are capable of regenerating their tails), unless this causal factor is
an intentional agent, it cannot be straightforwardly described as re-
storing itself. If nature was an intentional agent, then it would be con-
ceivable that nature could restore itself independent of intentional
human agency. Since the preservation paradox hinges on the concept of
nature as that realm of phenomena that is detached from human
agency, any actual restoration of nature by non-human causes would
render the paradox false.16 As it stands, however, there do not appear to
be any such examples. No one to my knowledge has persuasively ar-
gued that nature is an intentional agent capable of restoring itself.
Therefore, since the only intentional agents capable of restoring nature
appear to be human agents and these agents are barred from nature ex
hypothesi, there is further reason to maintain that the paradox appears
to hold up under scrutiny.
8. Resolving the preservation paradox – a brief sketch
Until now, the main purpose of this article has been to argue that
the preservation paradox is more difficult to resolve than ordinarily
recognized. The preservation paradox seems warranted. Yet, to simply
accept the paradox might seem absurd or unsatisfying at best, parti-
cularly for anyone who takes seriously the project of preserving natural
capital and ecosystem services for posterity. Accordingly, before con-
cluding, it seems valuable to sketch a way forward that explains how
the paradox might be avoided and what it means to preserve natural
capital during the Anthropocene.
Returning to the paradox as stated in Section 2, one option is to
negate P1. Nature is not a mysterious realm of phenomena hermetically
sealed-off from intentional human agency. Indeed, there are empirical
and metaphysical grounds for rejecting P1. Empirically, a growing
number of scientists and scholars have argued there is no longer any
part of the Earth’s surface that remains completely detached from in-
tentional human agency. Indeed, the technology of our species now
extends to include the Cydonia (the region of Mars), and beyond. If
‘nature’ is that realm of phenomena that is completely detached from
intentional human agency, then the extension of this concept appears to
be empty. To insist that there is a realm of phenomena that is com-
pletely unaffected by human activity is disconfirmed by the empirical
evidence.
Metaphysically, one might argue that while the species Homo sa-
piens possesses features that distinguish it from the rest of nature, since
Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species we have known that there is no
good reason to suppose that our species is located ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’
nature. Instead, if one supposes a naturalistic view of nature that is
contiguous with science, then everything actual and possible, including
human beings and their activity, is part of nature.
While denying P1 is one strategy for arguing against the preserva-
tion paradox, the concept of nature as everything actual and possible
presents a new challenge, however. After all, this concept entails that
preserving anything, including atomic bombs and jumbo jets, is nature
preservation. Obviously, no ecological economist or environmental
philosopher would be content with this outcome.
One promising way forward, as suggested elsewhere, is to accept the
naturalistic view of nature as everything actual and possible, while still
operationalizing the artificial/natural distinction for pragmatic pur-
poses (Sarkar, 2012).17 Operationally, the distinction is located along a
continuum, with the most natural objects being those that remain re-
latively detached from intentional human agency, and the most artifi-
cial objects being those that have been built by intentional human
agents. On this account, everything is, fundamentally, part of nature in
the metaphysical sense; yet, for practical purposes, we can still aim to
distinguish between anthropogenic (downtown New York City) and
non-anthropogenic (the remotest regions of Alaska) features of the
environment, an undertaking that is essential to preserving natural
capital during the Anthropocene.
16 Hence, O’Neill et al.’s (2008, 139) claim that the paradox is “more apparent
than real.”
17 For more details on this operational approach as it relates to conserving
and preserving natural capital during the Anthropocene, see DesRoches (2018).
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9. Conclusion
The preservation paradox has long puzzled environmental philoso-
phers, and perhaps it should puzzle scientists and scholars who aim to
preserve nature, too. If nature is a realm of phenomena that exists
outside of intentional human agency and preserving nature requires
intentional human agency, then how is it possible to preserve parts of
nature, including those denoted by the concept of natural capital?
While some environmental philosophers have argued that the pre-
servation paradox is false, this article argued that the paradox is more
difficult to resolve than ordinarily recognized. To make my case, I first
distinguished between artificial and natural objects, claiming that the
former class of objects are planned, possess a function, and have been
modified in some way by an intentional agent. While I claimed that it is
straightforward to see that merely preserving natural ecosystems sa-
tisfies the first and second conditions, it is less obvious that this activity
involves the third. After all, preserving natural ecosystems involves the
absence of human intervention. Nevertheless, I argued that when the
continued expression of a natural ecosystem is counterfactually de-
pendent on some intentional agent or group of agents omitting their
actions from the natural ecosystem, and this omission is a serious
possibility, then this omission counts as modifying the natural eco-
system. There are circumstances when merely preserving parts of
nature satisfies Hilpinen’s dependence condition.
Be that as it may, given that the paradox is unsatisfying at best,
particularly for those who wish to preserve parts of nature, Section 8
sketched a pragmatic solution to the paradox. To resolve the paradox, I
suggested that the first premise should be rejected. As a growing
number of environmental philosophers, historians, and scientists ac-
knowledge, nature is not a mysterious realm of phenomena hermeti-
cally sealed-off from intentional human agency. During the Anthro-
pocene, one can accept a naturalistic view of nature as everything
actual and possible and operationalize the artificial/natural distinction
for pragmatic purposes, simultaneously.
I will conclude with an objection and rebuttal. One might insist that
the preservation paradox seems irrelevant from an economic point of
view. After all, whether the paradox is warranted (or not) appears to
depend entirely on the artificial-natural distinction and the nature of
causation, issues that are completely divorced from the ordinary eva-
luative concerns of economists. There are at least three responses to this
objection. First, because many ecological economists and others are
concerned with preserving parts of nature qua natural capital, and this
policy proposal is thrown into question by the paradox, the paradox has
obvious significance, not only for the intellectually curious. Second,
natural capital is an interdisciplinary concept. Even if it turned out that
the paradox was irrelevant from an economic point of view, it would
not follow that the paradox is irrelevant from other disciplinary points
of view. Finally, while one might suppose that the artificial-natural
distinction is a mere terminological dispute that has no real con-
sequence for economics, the distinction is essential to the debate be-
tween weak and strong sustainability, which hinges on the further
distinction between natural and manufactured (man-made) capital.
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